Review by: Diana Deodato
What is the relationship between identification with populist parties and living in a geographic area marked by social inequality? The following review seeks to establish common points between these phenomena, particularly through the concept of left behind places, a term that, despite originating in the 1970s, gained prominence after the 2008 financial crisis. The discussion is based on the article “Left Behind Places: A Geographical Etymology” by Pike et al. (2023).
Pike et al. (2023) argue that the term left behind places has gained traction in geographical discourse since the 2008 crisis. While the concept is valuable for expanding the understanding of geographical inequalities beyond purely economic factors, its definition remains imprecise. According to the authors, the term is used with varied meanings and purposes and can serve to “oversimplify, reify, and stoke division and stigmatize.” Nevertheless, the concept is associated with several characteristics: “relative economic decline and lower productivity, employment and wages; lower levels of educational attainment and skills; higher levels of disadvantage and poverty; population shrinkage, outmigration, and ageing; poor health and wellbeing; limited social and economic assets, infrastructure, and underinvestment; lower public and private goods and services provision; and political neglect, disengagement and discontent.” (Pike et al., 2023, p. 4).
Residents in these areas may feel “trapped” due to low educational attainment, advanced age, or poor health, making them less attractive to the labor market. Meanwhile, younger and more qualified individuals can more easily relocate to regions with better job opportunities. This dynamic exacerbates the impoverishment of left behind places, as they struggle to retain active members of society, further diminishing their capacity for renewal. The authors highlight that these places “(…) contrast to fixed or fuzzy spatial imaginaries with specific purposes which focus on particular territories such as city-regions and regions” (Pike et al., 2023, p. 4). Their article explores the term’s implications and consequences in greater depth.
Initially, the article attempts to define the populations in left behind places. These individuals are often characterized by a range of negative indicators across various dimensions, such as “poor air quality” for the environmental dimension or “lack of public investment” for infrastructure. In areas where such indicators prevail, public discontent often arises, creating fertile ground for populist parties to gain traction.
By identifying one or more culprits for the situation these people face, populist parties achieve significant electoral results in these territories, mobilizing the “left behind” against the “elites” and presenting themselves as their only solution. In another text, Dijkstra, Poelman, and Rodríguez-Pose (2019) observe that many of these populist parties are also anti-European Union (EU). These parties portray the EU’s dominant policies as the primary cause of the discontent experienced by these populations. This divisive message is often coupled with a nationalist ideology in which the EU and migrants are depicted as a “threat to national identity.” When profiling the voters of these parties, the authors use the term left-behind, identifying characteristics such as older age, lower levels of education, low income, and, to a lesser extent, unemployment and limited geographic mobility.
In another article, Rodríguez-Pose (2018) argues that votes for populist parties by these populations represent “the revenge of the places that don’t matter.” While individuals are the agents of voting, they cast their votes for these parties because their living spaces have been “left behind,” as if it were the places voting, rather than the individuals.
Jay et al. (2019) link far-right populist parties to social inequalities. In an era where populist parties are achieving their best results since World War II (Mudde, 2016), inequalities have also risen to levels comparable to that period (Piketty & Saez, 2014). The authors emphasize that economic inequalities erode social cohesion, reducing popular support for initiatives related to education, health, and other public services (Bloomquist, 2011). In other words, the greater the economic inequality, the more institutional weaknesses are exposed. These parties capitalize on this fragility, using anti-state rhetoric to mobilize voters.
Other actors and phenomena have also contributed to these situations. Pike et al. (2023) suggest that neoliberal measures based on trickle-down economics were intended to transfer generated revenue to these areas, enabling them to catch up and achieve the same level of economic productivity as other regions. However, these measures, widely implemented since the 1980s in most of the world, may have intensified inequalities in these “forgotten” territories rather than alleviating them. Consequently, this economic approach became deeply unpopular among affected populations, fostering feelings of “being ignored, neglected, and overlooked by distant liberal, cosmopolitan, and metropolitan elites” (Pike et al., 2023, p. 6), sentiments often amplified by populist rhetoric. These parties use these places as examples of their narrative, presenting themselves as the only agents capable of transforming the paradigm.
As a result, the authors argue that the term left behind places is now used as a political tool by populist parties, who assign a homogeneous character to all regions falling into this category. This approach overlooks the diverse difficulties and idiosyncrasies each territory may face. Thus, the term has become a catch-all, lacking clear definitions and adaptable to any context as deemed convenient by those using it (Pike et al., 2023, p. 5).
Finally, Pike et al. (2023) analyze the potential future of the concept. They suggest that it may lose importance in some national contexts or come to describe more urbanized geographic areas. Regardless of its trajectory, the authors urge that the term be used positively, with the aim of highlighting economically and socially abandoned areas and seeking solutions to their challenges.
References:
Dijkstra, L., Poelman, H., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2019). The geography of EU discontent. Regional Studies, 54(6), 737–753. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2019.1654603.
Jay, S., Batruch, A., Jetten, J., McGarty, C., Muldoon, O.T. (2019). Economic inequality and the rise of far-right populism: A social psychological analysis. J Community Appl Soc Psychol, 29, 418–428. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2409.
Pike, A., Béal, V., Cauchi-Duval, N., Franklin, R., Kinossian, N., Lang, T., … Velthuis, S. (2023). ‘Left behind places’: a geographical etymology. Regional Studies, 58(6), 1167–1179. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2023.2167972.
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2018). The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 11(1), 189–209. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsx024.
Mudde, C. (2016). Europe’s Populist Surge: A Long Time in the Making. Foreign Affairs, 95(6), 25–30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43948378.
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2014). Inequality in the long run. Science, 344(6186), 838–843. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1251936.
